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1. INTRODUCTION  
International mergers and acquisitions (M&As), particularly those with giant transnational 
companies (TNCs) spending vast sums of money to take over firms in other countries, are one 
of the most visible aspects of globalisation. Such M&As are now the most important form of 
FDI, far outstripping investment in new facilities (‘greenfield’ investments) in terms of value 
(see various issues of UNCTAD, World Investment Report).
1 While most such M&As take 
place within the industrial world, they are also increasing in importance in the developing 
world (largely in the form of acquisitions since mergers with local firms are relatively 
uncommon). Cross-border M&As can have important implications for host countries. They 
tend to lead to substantial restructuring of existing facilities. They can lead to a repositioning of 
the acquired enterprise in global and local markets and to consolidating international networks 
of production, innovation and marketing (Maucher, 1998). They may involve significant 
layoffs and technological change. They may also lead to ‘asset stripping’, where the physical 
and other assets of the acquired firm are separately sold off and the enterprise wound up as a 
productive operation.  
Cross-border M&As are often regarded with suspicion and trepidation by developing 
countries. Many industrial countries also dislike the idea of national enterprises or property 
being taken over by foreign companies. However, developing countries feel more vulnerable 
because of the inherent asymmetry: their firms are not generally in a position to take over firms 
in the industrial countries from which most TNCs come and are more concerned with 
promoting the development of domestic entrepreneurship. Yet, there is a very strong revealed 
preference on the part of TNCs to enter countries by the M&A route, and restricting this route 
may well mean keeping out valuable FDI. This paper provides a ‘beginner’s guide’ to these 
issues in cross-border M&As in developing countries.  
For a start, it is important to note that the same forces drive both FDI and M&As: rapid 
technical change, shrinking economic distance, intensifying competition and policy 
liberalization. M&As are, however, more than just one of many modes of channelling direct 
investment: the form affects the content significantly. M&As may capture and create new 
synergies between national and foreign firms and, as such, may be an important means of 
restructuring national economies in line with emerging technological forces. Unlike FDI 
through greenfield ventures, they involve local enterprises directly in this restructuring and 
integration process. However, as with globalisation generally, the impact of M&As can be 
double-edged and uneven. Capital markets are not a perfect means of allocating resources and 
restructuring activities. TNCs do not operate with full information, and wrong decisions on 
M&As can lead to high economic and social costs in host economies. The private interests of 
TNCs may diverge from the social interests of host economies: take-overs may lead to asset 
stripping, downgrading of local capabilities or the transfer abroad of scarce assets.  
                                                 
1 While the data on M&As (which are lumpy and spread over different years) are difficult to compare directly with annual 
FDI inflow, UNCTAD estimates that around 80 percent of direct investment in the developed countries consists of cross-
border M&As. In the developing world, cross-border M&As reached a peak in 1998 at about $70 billion, 40 percent of total 
FDI inflows. The highest share (nearly 90 percent of FDI) was in Latin America, with Africa (including North Africa) at 31 
percent and Asia at about 19 percent. Calculated from Figure IV.8c of UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 3  
In fact, there appears to be a general presumption that in ‘normal’ circumstances (when 
there is no economic crisis or transition, and ignoring privatisation), FDI in the form of 
greenfield ventures is preferable to M&As. The former entails building a new plant, the latter 
involves only the transfer of an existing plant or firm from local to foreign hands. This 
suggests, at least at first sight, that greenfield FDI adds to the host country’s productive system, 
while M&As do not; on the contrary they ‘denationalise’ existing national assets and add to 
foreign exchange burdens without adding to productive capacity.  
This popular perception  has some validity, but it can also be misleading. A sound 
economic analysis of the effects of the two modes of entry must be based on a sound 
understanding of the global context and realistic counterfactuals. While there do remain 
differences between the two modes, these are not as large or evident as often thought by host 
governments. This paper provides a preliminary review of the analytical issues involved.  
2. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND 
There are essentially five ways in which a TNC can serve a foreign market:  
1.  No direct investment: serve the market by exports or licensing local firms.  
2.  Invest directly by a greenfield venture.  
3.  Invest directly by acquiring a local firm.  
4.  Invest directly by merging with a local firm.  
5.  Enter into a strategic alliance with a local firm.  
The choice between FDI and externalised means of serving markets (i.e. between 1 and the 
others) has been extensively analysed in the international investment literature. Once the 
decision to invest directly has been taken, however, the choice of mode and its economic 
effects on countries has received less attention (Dunning, 1999). The management literature 
has examined its ramifications from the company viewpoint, but the economic implications for 
host countries, particularly developing countries, remain unexplored.  
While a free choice between modes 2 to 6 is feasible in developed economies with 
liberal entry rules, strong private enterprises and well-functioning capital markets, this is not 
true of many developing and transition economies. Here the practical choices are more limited. 
For instance, M&As are not a realistic alternative to greenfield investment in the least 
developed countries (e.g. in Sub-Saharan Africa) where there is little to acquire in the private 
sector. However, there is considerable scope even here for the acquisition of state-owned 
enterprises as governments liberalise and privatise.
2 In developing countries with larger 
industrial sectors and better-developed capital markets, the acquisition of private enterprises is 
a realistic alternative to greenfield entry (though, unlike in industrial countries, it may be 
confined to low to medium technology activities). Mergers, however, are less feasible because 
of the large gaps between local and foreign firms in size, technology and management (though 
advanced newly industrializing economies (NIEs) like the Republic of Korea have firms with 
the size and capabilities that make them attractive for mergers). The same goes, more 
                                                 
2 Foreign exchange raised through privatisation (from both FDI and portfolio flows) represented about 44% of total 
revenue generated by privatisation in developing countries during 1990-97 (up from only 8% in 1980). In Sub-Saharan Africa 
the foreign exchange contribution to privatisation revenue was 59% in the 1990-97 period. In the last year for which data are 
available, foreign exchange represented 83% of privatisation revenue in SSA compared with only 43% in developing 
countries. Some 80-90% of this foreign exchange was in the form of FDI. Source: World Bank.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 4  
forcefully, for strategic alliances: few are likely in the developing world, though some exist in 
the most advanced NIEs.  
In most transition economies, at least early in liberalization, the acquisition of state-
owned enterprises is the most practical (sometimes the only permitted) way to enter the market. 
Thereafter greenfield entry becomes more likely, though mergers and strategic alliances are 
largely in the future for most countries. Thus, the focus on greenfield versus M&As makes 
considerable empirical sense in developing and transition economies. 
The management literature has investigated four aspects of the choice: investing firm 
characteristics, target country characteristics, industry characteristics and investment 
characteristics. The most common framework is transaction costs analysis, investors choosing 
the mode that minimises the costs of entry. Some important findings (drawing on Harzing, 
1999, and others) are as follows (some subtleties and qualifications in the argument are ignored 
below in the interests of brevity): 
* Firms with lower R&D intensity are more likely to buy technological capabilities abroad by 
acquisition, those with strong technological advantages are likely to set up greenfield 
ventures.  
* More diverse investing firms are likely to enter new markets by acquisitions.  
* In the recent (post 1980) period, firms with greater international experience have higher 
levels of acquisition than do others. 
*  Larger TNCs are traditionally more prone to acquire than small ones. However, in recent 
years smaller firms have become more prone to acquire as transaction costs of M&As have 
declined.  
* The greater the cultural and economic distance between the home and host countries, the 
less the probability of acquisition. Most M&As concentrate in developed home and host 
countries with similar cultural and business practices. 
*  Advertising intensity leads to more acquisitions if brands are valuable and cannot be easily 
transferred across countries. This propensity is strengthened where local firms have 
established distribution systems and extensive knowledge of the local market.  
* Greenfield investments offer the investor greater control and more ability to mould affiliate 
structures, systems and culture than acquisitions. Acquired firms have established 
structures, procedures and behaviour patterns that may be difficult to change.  
* For the same reason, greenfield investments will tend to have greater intra-company trade 
than M&As, which would have established local supply and demand links. 
* Acquisitions are encouraged by capital markets imperfections that lead to the 
undervaluation of company assets (Gonzalez et al. 1997). By a similar reasoning, they are 
also encouraged by economic crises that lead to sharp falls in asset prices generally.  
* Horizontal acquisitions are driven by the search for new markets, products and brands 
rather than cost cutting (Capron, 1999). Such acquisitions often lead to ‘asset 
rationalisation’ which can damage the acquired firm’s capabilities; however, where there is 
a transfer of competence, there is a synergistic benefit to both parties.  
* In the immediate post-acquisition period, there is substantial one-way (acquirer to acquired) 
technology transfer, often imposed. Over time, however, there is a more reciprocal process 
of technology transfer and sharing of tacit knowledge (Bressman et al. 1999).  
In sum, from the investor perspective, M&As in general offer  advantages over 
greenfield investments of rapid entry and access to existing proprietary assets (technology, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 5  
skills, organisation, information, supplier networks, brands, contacts etc.). Where capital 
markets are imperfect or in crisis, M&As also offer access to undervalued capital assets. In 
developing countries specifically, however, the advantage of M&As is rarely access to 
proprietary technology or skills (with exceptions in some NIEs). The advantage is more rapid 
entry, local market knowledge, established distribution systems and contacts with the 
government, suppliers or customers. Acquisitions (via the privatisation route) may also be the 
only way to enter some services and infrastructure activities; in countries where other 
investment opportunities are lacking, this may be the predominant form of FDI.  
The general  disadvantages of M&As lie in the cultural and organisational inertia 
inherent in any established concern that raises the cost of integrating the acquired firm into 
corporate systems and bringing its technologies and skills to international levels. Where the 
cost of changing ingrained habits, routines and skills is likely to be high, TNCs will prefer 
greenfield entry. Such problems are likely to larger in developing economies that have not been 
exposed to international competition and are far behind ‘best practice’ management and 
technological levels. In addition, local contacts with suppliers and customers may be worth 
very little in an economy that is liberalising and so has to drastically restructure its markets. 
The acquisition of private firms in developing countries also faces the difficulty that it may be 
costly and cumbersome to value companies where asset markets and corporate governance are 
weak or rudimentary.  
The assessment of the costs and benefits of the two modes will, of course, vary with 
corporate attitudes, information and global strategies. That is why different investors will opt 
for different modes of entry, or set very different prices and conditions on potential M&As, 
under the same conditions.  
3. ASSESSING M&AS VERSUS GREENFIELD FDI  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This section compares the possible costs and benefits to host economies of the two 
modes of entry under various headings. This can be done only be posing  realistic 
counterfactuals: what would have happened if the investment had not taken place (in that 
particular form).  
A realistic counterfactual must go beyond the individual investment to take account of 
the economic context in which investment takes place. This depends on the particular situation 
of each country as well as on the general context of trade, technology and competition in the 
developing world. As noted, the latter is changing. Trade liberalization, intensifying 
competition, accelerating technical change and increasingly integrated global production 
systems all mean that firms have to rapidly upgrade, restructure and become internationally 
competitive. This is true of all economies, regardless of  the macroeconomic situation. 
However, macroeconomic disturbances make the process much more difficult. Financial crises 
(as in East and Southeast Asia in 1997-1999), debt and fiscal problems (in parts of Africa) or 
high rates of inflation exacerbate pressures on firms, often making sheer survival difficult.  
Inward FDI provides a potent tool for upgrading competitiveness (UNCTAD, 1999). In 
economies where domestic technological capabilities and skills are weak and raising them 
to international levels is difficult, it is probably the most powerful available tool. Even in 
economies where capabilities are strong, the pace of technical change and the growth of 
international production systems often make TNC participation invaluable. M&As as a QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 6  
mode of inward FDI  is one important way to restructure and upgrade competitive 
capabilities (Maucher, 1998). Its contribution has therefore to be assessed relative to a 
situation where domestic firms (that do not get acquired or merged) have to face 
globalisation on their own. In addition, they have to face competition from the foreign 
investor which now, by assumption, mounts a greenfield venture in the same market.  
3.2 FINANCE 
Both greenfield and M&A investments add to financial resources in the host country (to the 
extent that neither is financed by raising local resources). Greenfield FDI manifests itself in 
new productive facilities while an M&A transfers the ownership of existing assets into 
foreign hands. The transfer places investible resources in the hands of the former owners 
(in cash or disposable shares) so the net financial effect is the same, if the size of the 
investment is identical. Both result in dividend outflows in due course. In the narrow sense, 
then, there is no difference between the two modes.  
In times of financial crisis, however, M&As can provide the additional benefit of saving 
domestic firms that are in a severe liquidity crisis (but otherwise viable), and contributing 
foreign exchange inflows for the economy as a whole. This has shown to be the case in 
East and Southeast Asia during the recent financial crisis (UNCTAD, 2000, forthcoming). 
To quote,  
“M&As became an important source of finance at the time of the crisis, thereby 
contributing to the speedy recovery of the economies. True, under normal 
circumstances it is possible for an acquirer to raise capital in the local financial 
markets without bringing in new capital from outside. But in the crisis-hit countries 
which experience a credit crunch and depressed domestic financial markets, cross-
border M&As necessarily entail fresh capital inflows from the outside.” (p. 16) 
At the same time, the fact that many firms were sold at depressed (‘fire sale’) prices 
suggests that M&As entail a net cost to the host economy compared to similar greenfield 
investments. This would be the case if the acquired firms could have survived without the 
external cash injection, not if they would have gone under. In the latter case, given that 
greenfield investment was probably not a realistic alternative at that time, M&As may 
represent a large net gain. If, on the other hand, acquisitions were driven by short-term 
financial considerations, and acquired assets sold off as soon as markets recovered, the M&As 
may represent a net cost to the host economy. Clearly it may have been better if the host 
economy could have obtained other sources of liquidity for local firms and so prevented ‘fire 
sales’, even if M&As were allowed later – at better and more stable prices. However, this 
option may not have been open in the depths of  the financial crises, and M&As may have 
provided very valuable injections of finance. 
Another risk of M&As applies to non-crisis conditions when the acquired company is 
broken up and different components are sold at a price higher than the cost of the acquisition 
(‘asset stripping’). This may be a sign of capital market imperfections because the market fails 
to value assets at their true value. However, it may also be a sign, in efficient capital markets, 
that firms are themselves managing their assets badly. In this case asset stripping may serve a 
useful economic function: the ill-managed firm may be divided into parts and the viable one 
may be placed under better management.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 7  
Under the heading of ‘finance’ we can also consider the effects of M&As and 
greenfield FDI on the crowding in and crowding out of domestic firms. While a merger or 
acquisition by definition is the transfer of assets from local to foreign owners (and so lower 
levels of domestic ownership in the economy), its effects on other local firms may be more 
beneficial than of greenfield entry. This is because an established local firm will tend to have 
strong domestic supply linkages than a new foreign entrant. In a liberal trade setting, the 
former may reduce domestic linkages (with or without foreign take-over) but to the extent that 
local suppliers are efficient (and over time have learned from buyers) domestic linkages are 
likely to persist. When local linkages are inefficient and the economy is exposed to foreign 
competition, there is likely to be a similar reaction between greenfield and M&A affiliates.  
The fact that a greenfield investment starts with low local linkages does not, however, 
necessarily mean crowding out – it just means less local stimulus to potential suppliers. Over 
the longer term, there is little reason to expect any difference in impact between both modes.  
Crowding out can also occur if a foreign firm has privileged access to local factors (capital 
and skills) relative to local competitors. This is certainly possible, but it can occur with 
both modes of entry.  
3.3 TECHNOLOGY  
Technology transfer: To the extent that a foreign investor enters a country to undertake 
productive activity over the long-term, there is no reason to expect different effects in terms of 
technology transfer by mode of entry. The TNC is presumably committed to operating 
efficiently in either case and will do whatever is needed to ensure this. However, a greenfield 
investment necessarily involves the setting up of a new facility and so new equipment 
embodying new technologies (though some TNCs may bring in used equipment where this is 
appropriate to local conditions). Using these new machines and technologies in turn involves 
the creation of new skills and information. A merger or acquisition involves taking over an 
existing stock of equipment with an accompanying body of skills, routines and work habits. In 
some cases, this may mean that M&As involve less efficient technologies to start with, but not 
always – for instance when existing technologies are better adapted to the local environment or 
have a strong learning base that allows equipment to operate more efficiently.  
Technology upgrading: In terms of upgrading technologies over time, the result can 
again go either way. An acquired firm may need considerable technological upgrading to bring 
it to competitive levels, and so may experience relatively rapid change compared to a new 
facility that is already near technical frontiers. On the other hand, the acquired firm may exhibit 
organisational inertia because of inherited habits and routines, making it difficult for the TNC 
to upgrade technologies. The technological move up the value chain is not expected to differ 
greatly by mode of entry. This move depends on market orientation, local skills and 
capabilities and corporate strategies (WIR, 1999). Whether the TNC acquires a firm or sets up a 
new one should not make any difference to the outcome. The evidence for Asia and Latin 
America shows that M&As can indeed lead to considerable technological upgrading. If the 
acquired firm had built up good research capabilities, this may be used by TNCs to boost 
R&D. 
Technology generation: M&As may lead to the preservation and enhancement of 
technological capabilities in firms under competitive pressure. This can be a particularly 
valuable contribution in economies opening up to international competition; and offers a better 
outcome than greenfield entry that may lead local firms to going out of business and losing QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 8  
their capabilities altogether. However, M&As may lead to the downgrading of technological 
(R&D) activity and status in acquired firms. If the acquired firm does not possess technological 
assets regarded as valuable by the parent company, or the role assigned to it in the global 
production system is lower than the role it had earlier, M&As can be deleterious to technology. 
This has been observed in Latin America and Eastern Europe, where affiliates reduce R&D or 
undertake simpler tasks than they did before, though there are many cases where the opposite 
has happened, with local research capabilities upgraded and brought to international levels. The 
real issue is, however, whether the mode of entry makes a difference to the TNC’s decision on 
local technological activity. Given local skills, factor prices and institutions, would an investor 
who downgrades an acquired firm’s R&D have undertaken greater R&D in a greenfield site? 
There is no strong a priori reason to expect this.  
It is also possible that an acquisition of a local technological leader allows the foreign 
firm to strip a local firm of its proprietary technological assets. This is one major reason why 
many developed countries seek to prevent the take-over of ‘national champions’ and so 
preserve locally strong sources of innovation and linkages with research institutions. The case 
is particularly strong in strategic defence technologies. This risk is certainly present and has to 
be safeguarded against, though in the context of this paper it applies only to a few advanced 
NIEs and transition countries.  
However, in normal circumstances a TNC acquiring a technologically strong firm will 
tend to preserve its R&D base and links with local technological sources. While particular 
technologies and products will certainly be exploited by the TNC system for export or other 
markets, it would be irrational to kill the goose that lays the research eggs. The more sensible 
strategy, which most TNCs adopt, is to strengthen local technological effort and linkages (this 
is Dunning’s ‘asset seeking’ FDI). We should also remember that ‘asset seeking’ FDI in the 
United States has been used by NIEs like Mexico, Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of 
China to boost their domestic technological base, without damage to the host economy.  
Technology diffusion: The outcome in terms of diffusing new technology and 
knowledge locally depends on the strength and economic efficiency of linkages established by 
acquired firms. If these are positive, TNCs will retain and strengthen them – in this case M&As 
will lead to better diffusion than greenfield sites in the short term. If they are inefficient, M&As 
will lead to less diffusion than before, but there should be then no difference from a greenfield 
investment.  
In sum, the differences in technological terms between the two entry modes will hinge 
upon the strength and efficiency of technological capabilities built up by the acquired firm 
as evaluated in a globally competitive context.  
3.4 EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS 
Employment quantity: At first sight, a greenfield investment raises employment while 
an M&A does not; in fact, many M&As in industrial countries result in significant reductions 
in employment in the acquired firm.
3 However, the picture becomes more complex if other 
factors and counterfactuals are considered. If the investment is aimed at the domestic market – 
which is by definition limited– the greenfield investment will (once it enters the market) 
                                                 
3 We only consider direct employment effects here. Indirect ones depend upon linkages, considered elsewhere.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 9  
necessarily reduce the activity of competing firms and so lead to a loss of employment in the 
latter. At the same time, if the entry raises efficiency and competition in the market, it may 
create additional employment. If the investment is aimed at (virtually unlimited) export 
markets, the greenfield venture is likely to add to employment in the short term. The long-term 
effect of both modes is likely to be similar.  
The reduction of employment in an acquired firm may not be a net loss if the local firm 
was in competitive difficulties and would have gone bankrupt in the absence of the acquisition. 
M&A entry then represents a net employment gain (even if the number of employees is smaller 
than before). In crisis-stricken or transition economies, this ‘employment preservation’ effect is 
common, and often quite strong (UNCTAD, 2000, forthcoming; Hunya and Kalotay, 2000).  
It is not clear, however, that it makes economic sense to tackle the employment issue at 
the firm level. If the economy is growing and labour markets are efficient, the firing of 
particular employees (who can find alternative employment according to their skills) is not 
merely irrelevant but desirable for flexibility and dynamism. If the economy is near full 
employment levels, a greenfield investment simply bids labour away from other firms and may 
raise wages for the relevant skills. Even if an economy suffers from unemployment and the 
government wishes to use FDI for employment generation, is not clear that it should prefer 
greenfield to M&A as a mode of entry. The problem of the counterfactual has already been 
noted, but there is a more general issue. Problems in employment creation may lie in inflexible 
labour markets, inappropriate skills, weak competitiveness, wrong trade and competition 
policies and so on. In these conditions, tackling the symptoms rather than the causes is an 
inefficient policy solution. 
Employment quality: E mployment quality refers to wages, employment conditions, 
gender issues and the like. TNCs generally offer high quality employment, unless they are in 
low technology export-oriented activities outside the purview of normal labour laws. A 
greenfield venture is likely in the short run to offer better quality if the inertia associated with 
acquisition leads the TNC to preserve old work norms in an acquisition. However, this effect is 
likely to erode if the acquired firm introduces new management practices and technology, and 
is integrated into the corporate network and culture of the parent. It is possible that the raising 
of employment quality in a formerly local firm has greater demonstration effects on other local 
firms than a greenfield affiliate.  
Skills: TNCs generally invest more in training than comparable local firms, and tend to 
bring in more modern training practices and materials. They also bring in expatriates with 
specialised skills, and tend to strike strong linkages with training institutions and schools. As 
with employment quality, the difference between the two modes is likely to lie in the short-
term inertia associated with the acquisition of a local firm. In the long-term there is no reason 
to expect any difference in impact.  
There is a risk that an M&A results in skilled employees being transferred abroad by the 
parent. This may be an undesirable brain drain from the host economy (though it may lead 
to higher welfare and skill creation for the employees concerned and also to the host 
economy when they return). We should also note that where the host economy has such 
desirable skills at low cost, TNCs can attract workers abroad by other means. A greenfield 
venture can bid workers away from other firms and send them abroad, or foreign firms may 
hire workers without having to invest locally at all. For instance, the substantial movement 
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means of FDI, and certainly not due to acquisitions of local firms. The risk of a net loss of 
skills by M&As is thus negligible.  
3.5 EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS  
FDI can be a powerful instrument for developing host countries to exploit their existing 
comparative advantages and build new advantages, as long as the countries are able to create 
new skills and capabilities and attract TNCs into higher value activities (WIR 1999). In the case 
of most new export-oriented activities including those located in EPZs, greenfield entry is the 
only feasible mode since there are no local firms to take over. In the case of existing activities 
that are oriented to domestic markets and can be restructured to become export-oriented, 
greenfield and M&A do provide alternatives. It is not clear, however, which mode is more 
desirable for the host country. The outcome could go either way, depending on the value of 
capabilities, skills and routines in existing local firms and the cost involved in bringing them to 
best practice levels. In the long-term, once more, there is little reason to expect any difference 
by mode of entry.  
In countries opening up to globalisation and international competition, M&As can, as noted 
for technology generation, be an effective means of preserving and upgrading existing 
capabilities. This has been the case, for instance, with the automotive component industry 
in Mexico, Brazil and more recently Thailand, where a large number of national firms have 
been taken over and restructured; the likely counterfactual was bankruptcy. Greenfield 
entry in this case would also be a way of building competitive facilities, but would imply a 
greater destruction of local capabilities.  
3.6 MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION   
The effect of TNC entry on domestic market structures and competition is unclear. Usual 
measures like concentration ratios  can be misleading as indicators, particularly when 
economies are open to import competition and TNCs congregate in scale and technology 
intensive activities. At the same time, the entry of large affiliates (often with giant parents 
merging with each other in their home countries) poses serious challenges to competition 
policy. While TNCs may be the leading forces in global competition and M&As may 
promote competition and restructuring rather than restrict it (Maucher, 1998), there needs 
to be effective regulation to counteract possible anti-competitive behaviour. The intense 
scrutiny exercised by industrial countries on their largest companies and their M&As 
shows how serious the risk is considered.  
At first sight greenfield entry appears to promote competition by adding a new facility, 
while M&As do not, and may reduce it when both firms were present as competitors. The net 
economic effects are less apparent once contestability and technologies are taken into account. 
Take some examples. In a protected market, new entry may indeed promote competition 
(though in small markets the scale of operations may be inefficient); however, in such a market 
collusion may also be easier. In a market open to import competition and new local and foreign 
investment, the form of entry need make no difference to effective competition. Where new 
technologies are being introduced, it may be desirable to have fewer firms that are able to reach 
achieve minimum economic size and provide the skills and networks to operate competitively. 
M&As may not reduce competition if the acquired firm would have gone out of business.  
The real issue is not so much the mode of entry as the ability of host governments to 
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regulation. This is now a highly skilled and demanding task. It needs, not a mechanistic 
application of market share rules, but an informed analysis of technology, scale, market 
conduct, contestability and consumer interest. With trade and investment liberalization, in fact, 
competition and regulation policy becomes the main tool in the area of FDI.  
Corporate governance: TNCs tend observe the same standards of corporate governance 
in their affiliates as at home, providing the same standards of disclosure, accounting, protection 
of shareholder rights and so on. Most developing and transition host countries lack similar 
standards in their domestic firms, and an advantage of FDI may be the introduction of 
international standards of corporate governance.  
It is likely that M&As are more beneficial in the first instance in this respect than 
greenfield investments.  “Cross-border M&As mean the creation of new stockowners who are 
interested in the ‘bottom lines’ and dividends, as well as stock market valuations of their newly 
acquired businesses. Effective corporate governance and full financial disclosures are thus 
naturally demanded and required.” (UNCTAD, 2000, forthcoming)  While greenfield entry 
also provides good corporate governance in the affiliates, M&As offer the additional benefit 
that they involve (in cases where foreign ownership is partial) local shareholders directly in the 
process. The spillover, demonstration and learning effects are likely to be greater.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
There do exist differences between TNC entry by greenfield and M&A in terms of the 
impact on host economies, most of which manifest themselves in the short term. The general 
presumption that greenfield investment is ‘better’ than M&A is not supported by the analysis, 
particularly if realistic counterfactuals are used. The outcome remains contingent on particular 
circumstances.  
In a globalising and liberalising world with rapid technical change, M&As are integral 
to the process of restructuring that enterprises and economies are undergoing all over the 
world. The fact that they involve local enterprises directly in the process is often seen as 
undesirable, but this may be precisely their advantage – they allow local capabilities to be 
preserved and enhanced rather than dispersed or destroyed. In periods of crisis or transition, 
M&As may be the only way to inject foreign resources and enable economies to adjust to new 
circumstances. The fact that acquired firms provide an element of inertia may be an advantage 
to the host economy in that existing linkages, skills and business practices can be preserved to 
the extent that they are efficient.  
The potential costs of in M&As are mainly as follows. They may downgrade local 
capabilities or drain them away from the host country. Efficient practices and linkages may be 
destroyed if they do not fit into the corporate culture or strategies of the parent TNCs. 
Inefficient elements of inertia may slow down the process of restructuring and technology 
transfer or development. Competition may be reduced in markets with low levels of 
contestability. Employment may be reduced. Assets may be purchased at unrealistic prices in 
fire sales or stripped for purely financial gain.  
It is not clear how large the costs of M&As actually are and if they are symptoms of 
larger policy or structural problems in host economies. Many of the costs turn out to be smaller 
than appear at first sight or founded on mistaken analysis. Clearly, deeper and more rigorous 
analysis is needed before generalisations can be made with confidence. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS88   Page 12  
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